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SELECTING AN INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION
MECHANISM FOR DISPUTES ARISING UNDER CHINA’S
BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE PROJECTS
INTRODUCTION
Investor–state arbitration (ISA) is a popular way to resolve investment law
disputes and has become a common component of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) and other international investment agreements.1 As China promotes its
cooperation among the countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa under its Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), an inter-state investment plan led by the Chinese
government, an increasing number of ISA cases among Chinese investors and
the countries along the ancient silk roads are foreseeable because the investment
in those countries are potentially risky.2 Also, the BRI is an investment plan
between states signed under memorandums of understanding (MOUs), which do
not have legal binding power.3 There is no treaty that specifically targets BRI
investments, and there are limited numbers of BITs between the BRI
participants.4 Because the features of the arbitration rules might affect the
outcome,5 it is important for BRI participants to incorporate the proper arbitral
forum for ISAs in future treaties.
This Comment begins with a brief description of the Belt and Road Initiative
and investor-state arbitration. This Comment then compares the disadvantages
and advantages for having arbitration under three institutions: the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). Some advantages of ICSID and
UNCITRAL include the institutions’ familiarity with Chinese law, incorporation
of Chinese legal features, and low costs. Although UNCITRAL and ICSID are
widely applied and included in most BITs between China and BRI countries,
Chinese investors might choose CIETAC to resolve the investment disputes that
arise under BRI projects.

1
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor–State Disputes Arising from Investment
Treaties: A Review, at 3–4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4 (Feb. 2006).
2
HUI LU ET AL., CHINA BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 2 (RAND Europe, 2018).
3
Alfred Wu et al., Belt and Road Initiative Managing Risk When Working with States and SOEs in
Infrastructure and Construction Projects, 2019 NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT 8.
4
Id.
5
LATHAM & WATKINS, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 13, 21 (2019).
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BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND THE RISKS UNDER BRI
INVESTMENT PROJECTS

The BRI, also known as One Belt One Road or yi dai yi lu, is a massive trade
and infrastructure project with an ambitious effort “to improve [regional]
connectivity and cooperation on a transcontinental scale.”6 The idea of the BRI
was raised in September and October 2013, when Chinese President Xi Jingping
visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia.7 The name of the plan has its origin
from the Silk Road because it mimics the ancient Silk Road, which traversed
Eurasia and the seas between China and Africa.8
The BRI consists primarily of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the New
Maritime Silk Road.9 The Silk Road Economic Belt refers to the infrastructure
and investment plan along the ancient Silk Road that starts from China and ends
in Europe. The New Maritime Silk Road refers to the cooperation plan along the
Indian Ocean, from Southeast Asia to East Africa.10 However the scope of the
initiative is not limited to those areas, rather it is claimed to be open for all
countries and international organizations for engagement.11 So far, seventy-six
countries from Asia, Africa, and Europe have participated in the BRI.12 These
projects are a “coherent enterprise of unprecedented scale: $4 trillion dollars of
promised investments … representing 70 percent of the world’s population, 55
percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy reserves.”13

6
Belt and Road Initiative, WORLD BANK (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regionalintegration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative; see Lily Kuo & Niko Kommenda, What Is China’s Belt and Road
Initiative?, GUARDIAN (July 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/whatchina-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer; Alexandra Ma, Inside ‘Belt and Road,’ China’s Mega-Project
That Is Linking 70 Countries Across Asia, Europe, and Africa, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.
businessinsider.com/what-is-belt-and-road-china-infrastructure-project-2018-1.
7
Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative, ST. COUNCIL CHINA (Mar. 30, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/
archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm.
8
China’s Belt and Road Plans Are to Be Welcomed and Worried, ECONOMIST (July 26, 2018), https://
www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/26/chinas-belt-and-road-plans-are-to-be-welcomed-and-worried-about.
9
Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (May 21, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
10
Id.
11
Full Text: Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative, ST. COUNCIL CHINA (Mar. 30, 2015), http://
english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm.
12
Frank Holmes, China’s Belt and Road Initiative Opens Up Unprecedented Opportunities, FORBES
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/09/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiativeopens-up-unprecedented-opportunities/#2084d96d3e9a.
13
Thomas Cavanna, What Does China’s Belt and Road Initiative Mean for US Grand Strategy?,
DIPLOMAT (June 5, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-meanfor-us-grand-strategy/.
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The BRI is comprised of various cross-border, bilateral, and multilateral
agreements.14 The BRI first put large emphasis on the industries of energy and
infrastructure. The scope of the BRI then expanded to trade, manufacturing,
tourism, and the Internet.15 Chinese state-owned entities—the companies in
which the Chinese government is a dominant stockholder—together with the
Chinese banks, are the most active participants and investors in BRI projects.16
The Reconnecting Asia Project, a research project led by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, tracks $90 billion of Chinese funding for BRI railway,
road, and port construction projects from 2014 to 2017.17 The American
Enterprise Institute and Heritage Chinese Global Investment Trackers report a
total of roughly $340 billion Chinese BRI investment across all sectors from
2014 to 2017.18 A senior Chinese official at the National Development and
Reform Commission, which is a top economic planning body, said “China
would spend a further $600–800 billion more over the next five years on
outbound investment,” with a large proportion of the money going into BRI
projects.19
Geographically, most BRI investment has gone to Southeast Asia and South
Asia.20 However, Africa, South America, and Europe are also benefiting.21 Marc
Merlino, Citibank’s Global Head of the Global Subsidiaries Group, stated that
there are “multiple levels” of potential opportunities for investors, especially
infrastructure and activities surrounding major projects under the plan.22
Merlino further stated, “It’s the opportunities for micro infrastructure beyond
the core projects. All the knock-on effects … if building a railroad, there’s going

14
Rupert Walker, Is China’s Ambitious Belt and Road Initiative a Risk Worth Taking for Foreign
Investors?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/
2136372/chinas-ambitious-belt-and-road-initiative-risk-worth-taking.
15
Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018: Navigating Pitfalls and Seizing Opportunities, DELOITTE
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.
html.
16
David Bateson, One Belt, One Road—Construction and Investor Risks, and Disputes, EXPERT GUIDES
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.expertguides.com/articles/one-belt-one-road-construction-and-investor-risks-anddisputes/ARINSWHT.
17
Jonathan Hillman, How Big is China’s Belt and Road?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., (April 3,
2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-belt-and-road.
18
Id.
19
Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018: Navigating Pitfalls and Seizing Opportunities, supra note 15.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Weizhen Tan, China’s Belt and Road Initiative May Have Risks, but Citi Still Sees Big Opportunities,
CNBC (May 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/03/chinas-belt-and-road-has-risks-but-banks-seeopportunities.html.
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to be a lot of goods and services moving. You need warehouses … distribution
capabilities. That’s where private investors are getting more involved.”23
While there are huge opportunities involved in BRI investment, weak
governance and compliance, undefined or poorly executed rule of law, and
corruption—which are not uncommon in the countries where large, debtfinanced, long-term infrastructure projects are located—increase the risk of
default on loans and payments, or even damages to physical assets.24 According
to one study, sixty-three countries covered under the BRI projects are at the risk
of “debt distress,” which means they have high possibilities of not being able to
repay the loan.25 Another study finds that eight BRI countries, including
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Pakistan, and Mongolia, have a particularly high
risk of default.26 For example, a Chinese corporation built Hambantota
International Port in Sri Lanka under the BRI project but Sri Lanka failed to
repay the Chinese loans that built the port.27 Although media often used the Sri
Lanka port as an example to illustrate that the Chinese government purposefully
puts countries in debt to control these countries, Chinese investors suffered from
the defaulting of the loan as well.28 Chinese investors not only lose money but
also lose bargaining power and sometimes even need to renegotiate the terms
for the projects that have already started.29 For instance, Malaysia recently put
off a rail project under the BRI and renegotiated to reduce the cost to one third
of the original loan.30
Also, most of the projects that involve BRI investors are large-scale projects,
which require a long time to finish and intense capital investments.31 According
to a study, the large-scale infrastructure investors are “particularly vulnerable to
regulatory changes that can undermine their profitability.”32 More than half of
the investor–state disputes involve utilities, constructions, and real estate

23

Id.
Andrew Cainey, Managing Risk to Build a Better Belt and Road, CHATHAM HOUSE (July 5, 2018),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/managing-risk-build-better-belt-and-road.
25
Yasheng Huang, Can the Belt and Road Become a Trap for China?, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (May 23,
2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Can-the-Belt-and-Road-become-a-trap-for-China.
26
Priyanka Kher & Trang Tran, Investment Protection Along the Belt and Road, 12 MTI GLOBAL PRAC.
28, (Jan. 2019).
27
Barry Sautman & Yan Hairong, The Truth About Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, Chinese “Debt Traps”
and “Asset Seizures,” SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 6, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/3008799/truth-about-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-chinese-debt-traps.
28
Huang, supra note 25.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Kher & Tran, supra note 26.
32
Id.
24
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sectors.33 Scholars also concluded that investors are less likely to invest in the
countries that provide weak property rights protections, which bring high
uncertainty for the investors.34
Finally, the level of protection the investment laws in the BRI countries
provide to the foreign investors vary.35 According to the analysis, most of the
investment laws in the BRI countries do not include an explicit provision for fair
and equitable treatment.36 Turkey and Russia have particularly low levels of
protection for foreign investors under all the provisions.37 Given the high
likelihood for disputes between investors and states under the BRI as well as
minimal protections for investors under the current legal mechanism, it is
essential to find an effective way to reduce potential risks and protect investors
moving forward.
II. OVERVIEW OF INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION
Investor–state arbitration (ISA) is the mechanism that solves disputes when
an investee-government makes discriminatory regulations or policies against
foreign investors including expropriating foreign investors’ property without
compensation, denying foreign investors’ justice in criminal, civil, or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings, or declining to transfer foreign
investors’ capital.38 When a foreign investor “feels that its rights under the treaty
been violated, it can bring a complaint for redress before an international
arbitration tribunal, normally composed and administered under the auspices of
a prominent arbitral institution but occasionally created ad hoc.”39 Investment
arbitration permits a foreign investor to sue the country that receives the
investment and guarantees the investor will have access to independent and
qualified arbitrators who can solve the dispute and render an enforceable
award.40 The foreign investor is thus allowed to bypass national jurisdictions,

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See Lise Johnson et al., Investor–State Dispute Settlement: What Are We Trying to Achieve? Does ISDS
Get Us There?, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (Dec. 11, 2017), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2017/12/11/
investor-state-dispute-settlement-what-are-we-trying-to-achieve-does-isds-get-us-there/.
39
Christopher Dugan et al., INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 2 (Oxford University Press 2011).
40
See International Arbitration Information, INT’L ARB. INFO., https://www.international-arbitrationattorney.com/investment-arbitration/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2020).
34
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which may be biased or lack independence, to resolve the dispute in accordance
with different protections afforded under international treaties.41
Investment arbitration involves “public international law grafted onto a
substructure of private commercial arbitration,” which means a host state must
give consent before foreign investors are able to initiate investment arbitration.42
Consent to ISA takes many forms, including provisions to agree to have ISA in
investment contracts, domestic investment law, and bilateral investment treaties
(BITs).43 A BIT, a type of an international investment agreement, is signed by
two countries and lists out the standards of protection for investors from one
country to invest in the other country.44
Since the 1960s, there have been approximately 3000 BITs, which cover
most of the countries in the world.45 A BIT not only requires the countries to
provide protection to foreign investors, but also creates the possibility for those
investors to bring claims against the investee country under international
arbitration instead of in the local courts.46 Investor–state disputes between two
countries that have signed a BIT would be governed by international law and
relevant treaties instead of the laws referred to in the investment contract.47 More
than 150 states are parties to the New York Convention, the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958.48 The New
York Convention “establishes a regime of quick and easy enforcement of
arbitration awards without re-litigating the dispute on its merits.” 49

41

Id.
Andrea Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 1269,
1270 (2009).
43
Lise Johnson et al., Withdraw of Consent to Investor–State Arbitration and Termination of Investment
Treaties, INV. TREATY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/04/24/withdrawal-of-consent-toinvestor-state-arbitration-and-termination-of-investment-treaties-lise-johnson-jesse-coleman-brooke-guven/.
44
International Investment Agreements, MINISTRY TRADE & INDUSTRY SINGAPORE, https://www.mti.
gov.sg/Improving-Trade/International-Investment-Agreements (last visited Jan. 9, 2020).
45
Wolfgang Alschner, The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth Versus
Reality, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2017).
46
The Basics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, https://www.sidley.com/en/us/
services/global-arbitration-trade-and-advocacy/investment-treaty-arbitration/sub-pages/the-basics-of-bilateralinvestment-treaties/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2020).
47
Id.
48
Justin D’Agostino & Briana Young, Negotiating Roadblocks? Resolving Disputes on the Belt and
Road, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/
negotiating-roadblocks-resolving-disputes-on-the-belt-and-road.
49
Id.
42
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China is already party to 128 BITs, including many with BRI countries.50
However, earlier BITs that China signed with BRI countries mostly focused on
foreign investment in China but provided little protection for Chinese investors
overseas.51 Recent BITs signed between China and BRI countries contain vague
definitions and are broad in scope.52 For instance, the asset-based definitions of
investment in some of these BITs do not exclude the public debt when defining
the investment, which would make the interpretation difficult.53 Most
importantly, some of the treaties do not even include the dispute settlement
mechanisms. For example, Turkmenistan does not provide any type of investor–
state dispute settlement mechanism and Georgia does not provide any
alternatives to arbitration or list the forum for arbitration.54
Without an effective dispute settlement mechanism, the de jure legal
provisions “are merely promises on paper.”55 Therefore, having an effective
mechanism to settle the disputes is crucial to ensure the protection and rights of
the investors would be achieved.56 The reason to use arbitration is to bring a
degree of clarity and effectiveness among countries with diverse legal
traditions.57 While there are a lot of options for dispute settlement mechanism
under arbitration, incorporating appropriate arbitration forum while signing or
amending the investment treaties would be helpful to the investors by ensuring
the clarity and consistency in the dispute settlement mechanisms.58
III. COMPARISON OF INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION INSTITUTION
FOR BRI PROJECTS
This section describes the two most commonly used investor–state
arbitration forum, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
and the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, along with the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, a Chinese
arbitration institution, which just began to handle the investor–state disputes.59

50
Patrick Norton, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges for Arbitration in Asia, 13 U. PA. ASIAN
L. REV. 72, 100.
51
Id.
52
Kher & Tran, supra note 26.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Joe Zhang, China’s Largest Arbitration Institution Adopts Its First Investment Arbitration Rules,
INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://www.iisd.org/library/china-s-largest-arbitration-institution-adopts-
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This section also analyzes the advantages and disadvantages for Chinese
investors when using different arbitration rules when conducting ISA to resolve
disputes arising from BRI projects.
A. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States was formed by the World Bank.60 The Convention
established the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) in 1965.61 ICSID does not issue the arbitration itself, it provides
procedural and institutional rules for each independent arbitral tribunal that
forms for each different arbitration case.62 The party initiates the ICSID
arbitration by submitting a request, which describes the facts and legal issues
that the party wants to address to the Secretary-General of ICSID.63 Once the
ICSID decides the issue is within its jurisdiction and registers the request, parties
begin to nominate the arbitrators that form the arbitration tribunal.64 Independent
jurists from different countries serve as ICSID arbitrators.65 The parties involved
in the dispute appoint their arbitrators from a list of these ICSID arbitrators to
decide their case.66 After the arbitral forum is created, the arbitration process is
deemed to have begun.67 The ICSID proceeding may be held at any location
according to the parties’ agreement, including World Bank facilities or
arbitration centers like Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre.68 The
parties deal with procedural questions typically within sixty days of the
formation of the tribunal.69 Then the parties may have a written procedure and
in-person hearings to present the case.70 The tribunal issues the award after this

its-first-investment-arbitration-rules (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
60
Gautami S. Tondapu, International Institutions and Dispute Settlement: The Case of ICSID, 22 BOND
L. REV. 81, 81 (2010).
61
Id.
62
Christoph Schreuer, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), UNIVERSITÄT
WIEN, https://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/100_icsid_epil.pdf.
63
World Bank Grp., Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), WORLD BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/ICSID%20Fact%20Sheet
%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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whole process and the award is “binding and not subject to any appeal or other
remedy except those provided by the [ICSID].”71
China signed the ICSID Convention in 1993 with a reservation that “it would
only consider submitting to the jurisdiction of ICSID disputes over
compensation resulting from expropriation or nationalization after the domestic
court already established liability.”72 Since 1998, China’s BITs began granting
consent to ICSID dispute settlements without this restriction.73 However, some
BITs that were signed before 2000 still contain language that treaties extend
jurisdiction only to disputes “relating to the amount for compensation for
expropriation.”74 Debate exists regarding the application of the jurisdiction
under BITs.75 One interpretation of this provision is that the domestic court
needs to determine if expropriation has happened before the tribunal
procedure.76 The other interpretation is whether the dispute relate to the
compensation for expropriation is an issue for the arbitration tribunal to decide.77
Recently, two investor–state arbitration cases brought before the ICSID by
Chinese investors addressed this jurisdiction issue.78
1. Advantages of ICSID
a. Independence and Autonomy
One of the major advantages, for both investor claimants and responding
states to use ICSID for BRI investment arbitration, is that ICSID is an
institutionalized system, which is completely independent from any domestic
legal system.79 The ICSID has total control over the interpretation and revision
of the rules, and annulment of awards.80
71

Id.
Mihaela Papa, Emerging Powers in International Dispute Settlement: From Legal Capacity Building
to a Level Playing Field?, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 83, 83 (2013).
73
China-Related Investment Arbitrations: Three Recent Developments, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS
(July 17, 2017), https://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2017/07/17/china-related-investment-arbitrations-three-recentdevelopments/.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See Process Overview, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/pages/
process/overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
80
See Katharina Diel Gligor, Comment, Competing Regimes in International Investment Arbitration:
Choice Between the ICSID and Alternative Arbitral Systems, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 677, 680 (2011); see also
OECD Secretariat, Improving the System of Investor–State Dispute Settlement: An Overview, ¶ 9 (Dec. 12,
2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/35808448.pdf; Georges
72
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The ICSID is comprised of two operational agencies—the Secretariat and
the Administrative Council.81 The Secretariat is a permanent body of the ICSID
and it executes the daily administrative functions of ICSID.82 The Secretariat
will take part in the arbitration procedure,
acting as registrar in proceedings (for example, receiving, reviewing
and registering requests for arbitration and conciliation and
authenticating awards); assisting in the constitution of Conciliation
Commissions, Arbitral Tribunals and ad hoc Committees; assisting
parties and Commissions, Tribunals and Committees with all aspects
of case procedure; organizing and assisting at hearings; administering
the finances of each case; and providing other administrative support
as requested by Commissions, Tribunals and Committees.83

The Administrative Council supervises the operational activities of ICSID,
including creation of rules of procedure for ICSID cases, adoption of the
administrative and financial regulations for the Centre and approval of the
financial budget for the Centre.84 The ICSID Secretary-General and Deputy
Secretary-General are both elected by the Council.85 The President of the World
Bank serves as the Chairman of the Administrative Council.86 Each member
state of the ICSID has one representative on the Administrative Council.87
Member countries to the Council are allowed one vote each for the decisions
made by the Administrative Council.88 The self-running organization and
structure of ICSID ensures the independence and autonomy of ICSID arbitration
decision.
b. A Final and Binding Award
Moreover, the ICSID award is final and binding upon the parties, which is
an advantage for both the investor-claimant and the state-respondent.89 ICSID

Delaume, ICSID Arbitration in Practice, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 58, 67 (1984).
81
See Administrative Council, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/
Pages/about/Administrative-Council.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2020); Secretariat, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT
INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Secretariat.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
82
Secretariat, supra note 81.
83
Id.
84
See Administrative Council, supra note 81.
85
Id.
86
See id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Recognition and Enforcement—ICSID Convention Arbitration, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV.
DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Recognition-and-Enforcement-Convention-Arbitration.aspx (last
visited Jan. 10, 2020).
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Convention Article 53(1) provides that, “The award shall be binding on the
parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or any other remedy except for
those provided for in this Convention.”90 The state domestic court is not able to
reconsider the ICSID arbitration award.91 After the ICSID award is recognized
in accordance with ICSID procedural rules, the award is valid and should be
recognized immediately without any judicial interference.92 This feature makes
the ICSID award a more favored approach to reach a final result when compared
with domestic law or other conventions which requires the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment by a judicial body.93
The only way to challenge the final decision of the ICSID is by the procedure
stated in ICSID Convention, Article 52(1):
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal
has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on
the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award
has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.94

Failure to comply with the judgment of the ICSID constitutes a breach of ICSID
Convention obligations.95 The Convention does not provide any exception for
the member state to not recognize and enforce the arbitration award issued by
the ICSID, even for reasons based on public policy.96 These features ensure the
whole arbitration process will be recognized in all member countries without
interference from the domestic jurisdiction once the parties recognize the
arbitration will be held under the ICSID and the issue falls under the jurisdiction
of the ICSID.97
c. ICSID’s Network Externalities Effect
The final argument for choosing the ICSID is because it is widely adopted
in BRI countries and a lot of BITs between China and BRI countries refer to
ICSID as the proper institution to settle the investor–state disputes.98 There have
90
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
art. 53, ¶ 1, Apr. 10, 2006 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
91
Georges Delaume, ICSID Arbitration in Practice, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 58, 67 (1984).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
ICSID Convention supra note 90, art. 52, ¶ 1.
95
See Katharina Diel Gligor, Competing Regimes in International Investment Arbitration: Choice
Between the ICSID and Alternative Arbitral Systems, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 677, 685 (2011).
96
Delaume, supra note 80, at 92.
97
Id. at 76–77.
98
Bird & Bird & One Belt One Road and Investment Treaty Disputes: Investment Treaty Arbitration for
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been several cases initiated by Chinese investors who chose ICSID as the
arbitration institution. Examples include, Tza Yap Shum v. Peru where the
tribunal found for the claimants, China Heilongjiang v. Mongolia in which the
award not was public and the tribunal reportedly dismissed the claim on
jurisdictional grounds, and Ping An Life Insurance v. Belgium in which the
claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.99
The current market dominance of the ICSID should continue as the
emergence of other institutional competition is constrained by network
externalities.100 Network externalities occur when the market has settled with a
single standard for a service, like arbitration.101 With all competitors
significantly marginalized, it creates a monopoly-type situation that prevents
potential rivals from successfully challenging the market dominance of the
prevailing standard.102 This argument comes from the concept of “institutional
lock-in,” first put forth by 1993 Nobel Prize winner Douglass C. North.103 North
argues, “institutions that already enjoy a foothold ‘generate powerful
inducements that reinforce their own stability and future development.’”104
Because the ICSID “presently dominates the investment arbitration service
world,” network externalities are being generated further bolstering the ICSID’s
market dominance and precluding other arbitration institutions from entering the
investment arbitration service market.105
2. Disadvantages of ICSID
a. High Cost and Lack of Efficiency
While the ICSID has many advantages, criticism against the ICSID exist as
well. The length and costs of arbitral proceedings are rising “due to the growing
complexity of ICSID cases, the fragmented nature of investor protection

Disputes on the Silk Road, BIRD & BIRD, https://www.twobirds.com/~/media/pdfs/one-belt-one-road-andinvestment-treaty-disputes.pdf?la=en&hash=41BE06F0D2208FFC9401F5A817F9D52DF3D42B4D (last visited
Jan. 10, 2020).
99
Diane Desierto, China as a Global ISDS Power, INV. CLAIMS (Aug. 2018), http://oxia.ouplaw.com/
page/715.
100
Andrea K. Bjorklund & Bryan H. Druzin, Institutional Lock-In Within the Field of Investment
Arbitration, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 707, 711 (2018).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 712.
104
Id. (quoting Paul Pierson, Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent
Democracies, in THE POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 410, 415 (Paul Pierson ed., 2001)).
105
See Bjorklund & Druzin, supra note 101, at 712.
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provisions and multiplication of interlocutory proceedings.”106 The average
length for a case arbitrated before the ICSID is 3.6 years.107 Although the amount
and complexity of cases has risen dramatically in past years, the ICSID structure
has remained the same—small and staffed with about a dozen attorneys.108 Thus,
it is hard for such a small staff to efficiently adjudicate the highly technical ISA
process.109 Moreover, research shows that the costs are unequally distributed and
the state bears a heavier burden.110 According to an ICSID arbitration rule, both
parties share the cost of proceedings even when no fault is found on the
respondent state.111 Thus, “the allocation of cost almost always operates to the
disadvantage of the respondent state because the private investor is almost
always the party who initiates the process.”112
Developing countries, including China and many BRI countries, should take
greater consideration of the costs of the arbitration procedure.113 Such states
resort to spending money on law firms to represent them in the arbitration, which
is usually extremely expensive.114 Arbitration is highly lucrative for law firms—
390 cases have been filed by law firms on behalf of multinational companies
against governments.115 Governments have spent tens of millions of dollars to
pay law firms to represent them in arbitration on top of billions of dollars of
compensation to arbitrators and for arbitration fees.116

106
Justine Touzet & Marine Vaublanc, The Investor–State Dispute Settlement System: The Road to
Overcoming Criticism, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 6, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/
08/06/the-investor-state-dispute-settlement-system-the-road-to-overcoming-criticism/.
107
Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?, 4 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 18, 20 (2009).
108
Andrew Tuck, Investor–State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed
Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 885, 910 (2007).
109
Id.
110
Won Kidane, The China–Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID Legitimacy Debate, 35 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 559, 621 (2014).
111
Practice Notes for Respondents in ICSID Arbitration, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (2015),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Practice%20Notes%20for%20Respondents%20-%20
Final.pdf.
112
Kidane, supra note 110, at 622.
113
See Hansel T. Pham, Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation in the DSU,
9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 331, 390 (2004).
114
See ICSID and Latin America: Criticisms, Withdrawals, and Regional Alternatives, ISDS PLATFORM
(June 2013), https://isds.bilaterals.org/?icsid-and-latin-america-criticisms.
115
See Nick Buxton et al., Legalized Profiteering? How Corporate Lawyers Are Fueling an Investment
Arbitration Boom, TRANSNAT’L INST. (Nov. 2011), https://www.tni.org/files/download/legalised_profiteeringweb.pdf.
116
Id.
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b. Lack of Jurisprudential Coherence
Another disadvantage of the ICSID is that it lacks jurisprudential coherence,
which might make a claimant hesitant to bring a case before the ICSID.117 When
the legal system produces coherent results, it contributes to the system’s
credibility and legitimacy.118 However, ICSID tribunals, unlike common law
courts, are not bound to their own precedent.119 For example, the ICSID
Convention does not explicitly define the term investment, and the tribunals have
established a variety of investment qualification frameworks, construing
investment both narrowly and broadly.120 The Salini test has been considered as
a general doctrine about the definition of investment.121 However, “tribunals
have used their discretion in applying and articulating the Salini test.”122
Another criticism of the ICSID focuses on the interpretation of the
annulment process.123 As mentioned previously, the arbitral awards made by the
tribunals are final and not subject to any appellate process except as provided in
the Convention.124 The annulment mechanism was designed to focus only on
correcting procedural mistakes.125 However, an increasing number of cases have
made contradictory interpretations regarding the annulment process.126 Two
cases brought against Argentina illustrate this confrontation.127 In CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic the annulment committee, which is the
body of the ICSID that decides the annulment issues, intensely analyzed and
criticized the legal reasoning and ruling of the arbitral decision.128 Although the
117
See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The
Standard of Review in Investor–State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. (2010).
118
Consistency, Efficiency, and Transparency in Investment Treaty Arbitration, INT’L B. ASS’N (Nov.
2018).
119
See Joseph Boddicker, Whose Dictionary Controls?: Recent Challenges to the Term “Investment” in
ICSID Arbitration, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1031, 1069 (2010).
120
See, e.g., Fedax N. V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Objections to Jurisdiction,
¶ 22 (July 11, 1997) (stating that “loans, suppliers’ credits, outstanding payments, ownership of shares, and
construction contracts” have all qualified as “investments”).
121
Alex Grabowsky, Comment, The Definition of Investment Under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of
Salini, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 287, 287 (2014). The Salini test defines an investment as having four elements: (1) a
contribution of money or assets; (2) a certain duration; (3) an element of risk; and (4) a contribution to the
economic development of the host state. Id.
122
See Boddicker, supra note 120, at 1041.
123
Christopher Smith, The Appeal of ICSID Awards: How the Aminz Appellate Mechanism Can Guide
Reform of ICSID Procedure, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 567, 572 (2013).
124
ICSID Convention supra note 90, art. 52, ¶ 1.
125
Smith, supra note 123, at 573.
126
Eun Young Park, Appellate Review in Investor–State Arbitration, 1 TDM 443 (2014).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 6 (citing CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Annulment Proceeding, (Sept. 25, 2007)).
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committee in this case did not annul the arbitral award due to lack of jurisdiction,
this case was seen as an attempt by the annulment committee to question the
lack of appellate review in the ICSID.129 In contrast, the annulment committee
in Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic “took a more active approach and
decided to annul the arbitral award based in part on the logic provided by the
CMS Committee.”130
Many experts have advocated for reforming the annulment procedure in the
ICSID committee and replacing it with a real appellate system.131 Interpretation
of annulment procedure adds another layer of inconsistency to the ICSID
tribunal awards, further threatening the ICSID system.132 While some scholars
argue that investors prefer a final and binding result, placing less value on the
certainty of the arbitration decision, the unpredictability has already driven
countries including Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela away from the ICSID
Convention, specifically because large monetary damages resulting from ICSID
arbitrations lack consistent precedent and are not subject to review.133
c. Low Confidentiality
Investor–state arbitration has long been a confidential process lacking public
hearings between disputing parties.134 Accordingly, there are strong reasons for
both investors and states to be concerned with the confidentiality of the
arbitration process. Investors are especially worried about “forced disclosure of
confidential business information, trade secrets, and investment strategies” that
could harm the commercial interests of the investors’ business.135 Similarly,
governments fear that exposing the inner workings of their administrative and
regulatory institutions will have a potential adverse impact on their reputations
as hosts of foreign investment and on their domestic political figures.136
Some people believe that—unlike commercial arbitration, which resolves
disputes between private parties—ISA involves public interests because the host
state enters as a party during the arbitration and the result of arbitration might

129

Id.
Id. (citing Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Annulment
Proceeding, (June 29, 2010)).
131
Smith, supra note 123, at 574.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 575.
134
Leon Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 604, 635 (2012).
135
Samuel Levander, Note, Resolving “Dynamic Interpretation”: An Empirical Analysis of the
Transparency, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 506, 514 (2014).
136
Id.
130
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have a significant impact on the economic and public welfare of that state, thus
arguing that ISA’s ought to require a more transparent procedure.137 After the
revision of the ICSID rules in 2006, revised Rule 32 allows the tribunal to permit
persons other than the parties and attorneys to attend hearings and even open up
hearings to the public without both parties’ consent, provided the tribunal
considers the views of the disputing parties and consults with the Secretariat.138
Open hearings could provide the public with greater transparency of ICSID’s
ISA process.139
Modification has also been made since 2006 regarding the publication of
ISA awards.140 Under the original ICSID Rule 48, the publication of arbitral
awards without the consent of both parties was prohibited.141 A text change
added in 2006 has the ICSID Secretariat promptly publish excerpts of the
tribunal’s legal reasoning for every award, regardless of the parties’
agreement.142 The transparency and low confidentiality feature of ICSID will
make Chinese investors hesitate to choose ICSID for fear of disclosure of their
trade secrets.
B. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Together with ICSID, the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules serve as the procedural basis for more than
eighty percent of all investment arbitration cases brought on the basis of
international investment agreements.143 The UNCITRAL was established by the
U.N. General Assembly by Resolution 2205 (XXI) on December 17, 1966.144
The rules have been used for the settlement of a variety of disputes, including
commercial ad hoc arbitration (arbitration that the parties need to decide all

137
See OECD, Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor–State Dispute Settlement
Procedures, Statement (OECD Investment Committee, Working Paper on International Investment No. 2005/1,
2005), 2, 13 ¶ 49.
138
Tuck, supra note 108, at 897.
139
ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration (ICSID Secretariat
Discussion Paper, Oct. 22, 2004), at 10 [hereinafter ICSID Discussion Paper].
140
Georgetown Univ. Law Library, International Investment Law Research Guide, GEO. L.,
https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/InternationalInvestmentLaw (last updated Aug. 27, 2019 8:49 PM).
141
Gligor, supra note 95, at 684.
142
Id.
143
See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Latest Developments in Investor–State Dispute
Settlement, IIA Issues Note No. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3 (2010) (ICSID cases 63%; UNCITRAL
cases 25%).
144
A Guide to UNCITRAL: Basic Facts About the United Nations Commission on International Law,
UNCITRAL (2013), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf.
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aspects of the arbitration themselves), commercial institutional arbitration
(arbitration administered by the institution), and ISA.145
UNCITRAL is not an institution that administers arbitrations, like the
ICSID, but instead sets up the arbitration rules to guide the parties to set up their
own independent arbitration process. 146 UNCITRAL identifies three different
usages of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules by arbitration institutions and other
similar bodies. First, the rules serve as a model for institutions to draft their own
arbitration rules.147 Second, institutions have offered to resolve disputes or
provide administrative services in ad hoc arbitration under the rules.148 Third,
the institutions may be requested by the parties in the disputes to act as an
appointing authority as provided for under the rules.149
The parties give consent to be governed under UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules by including an arbitration clause in the individual investment agreement
or an ad hoc agreement after the disputes arise.150 Some BITs contain an
arbitration clause that exclusively provides for an ad hoc arbitration under the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.151 One example of referring the utilization of
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which states that investors may initiate arbitration against a NAFTA
party under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules152 In 2006, it was recognized that
the 1976 Rules needed to be revised to meet changes in arbitral practice.153 In
2010, UNCITRAL approved a revised version of the rules which became
effective on August 15, 2010.154 China has broadened its consent to arbitration
for investment since its agreement with Barbados in 1998.155 The majority of

145
UNCITRAL
Arbitration
Rules,
UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/
contractualtexts/arbitration (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
146
Ulrich G. Schroeter, Ad Hoc or Institutional Arbitration—A Clear-Cut Distinction? A Closer Look at
Borderline Cases, 10 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 141, 155 (2017).
147
Recommendations to Assist Arbitral Institutions and Other Interested Bodies with Regard to
Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (As Revised in 2010), UNCITRAL, https://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-recommendation-2012/13-80327-Recommendations-Arbitral-Institutionse.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Recommendations].
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Norbert Horn, Current Use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in the Context of Investment
Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L 587, 588 (2008).
151
Id. at 589.
152
NAFTA Investor–State Arbitrations, U.S. DEP’T. ST., https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited
Jan. 12, 2020).
153
Id.
154
Rep. of the U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/65/17, ¶ 187 (2010).
155
Julian G. Ku, Enforcement of ICSID Awards in the People’s Republic of China, 6 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB.
J. 31 (2013).
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bilateral treaties signed by China between 1998 and 2008 recognize arbitral
tribunals under the administration of the ICSID or an ad hoc UNCITRAL
arbitration to resolve investment related disputes.156
UNCITRAL arbitration comes with a presumption that the tribunal for
resolving investment arbitration consists of three arbitrators, unless the parties
agree to choose the arbitrators another way within thirty days after the
respondent receives notice of the arbitration.157 More importantly, according to
UNCITRAL Article 7, each party has the right to appoint one arbitrator, and the
two arbitrators appointed by both parties have the chance to select the presiding
arbitrator.158 There are no specific requirements set out in the UNCITRAL Rules
with respect to the qualifications or nationality of arbitrators.159 However, an
appointing authority is obliged to consider “the advisability of appointing an
arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties.”160 Because
parties can designate an appointing authority, the UNCITRAL rule of
appointment prevents the deadlock that might lead to the need for an application
to a national court.161
1. Advantages of UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules
a. Parties Bear Less Burden to Challenge the Arbitrator’s Impartiality
UNCITRAL has a lower standard of proof to challenge the impartiality of
the appointed arbitrator comparing with ICSID.162 UNCITRAL Article 12
requires the appointed arbitrators to disclose any circumstances that are likely to
give rise to justifiable doubts about their impartiality or independence.163 A
prospective arbitrator should disclose such circumstances to the party that

156
Karl P. Sauvant & Michael D. Nolan, China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment and International
Investment Law, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 893, 915 (2015).
157
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010), UNCITRAL, art. 7 (Apr. 2011),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010].
158
Id.
159
See generally id.
160
Jeffery Sullivan & Manthi Wickramasooriya, Investment Arbitration: A Comparison of ICSID and
UNCITRAL Arbitration for Investment Arbitration, 20 CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 135, 140 (2013).
161
See generally Paul Darling, Who Do You Want. Who Do You Get: Appointment the Right Arbitrator,
12 ASIAN DISP. REV. 19, 20 (2010).
162
Al-Hawamdeh et al., The Effects of Arbitrator’s Lack of Impartiality and Independence on the
Arbitration Proceedings and the Task of Arbitrators Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, 11 J. POL. & L. 66
(2018).
163
Diana-Loredana Hogas, Insights on the Arbitrator’s Requirement of Independence, J.L. & ADMIN. SCI.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 235 (2015).
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approaches him or her, and an appointed arbitrator should disclose such
circumstances to the parties or the other arbitrators in so far as they have not
already been informed.164 “The notion for challenging the arbitrator’s lack of
impartiality and independence under UNCITRAL is the existence of the
circumstance, which is likely to give rise to ‘justifiable doubts’ rather than actual
existence of partiality and dependence.”165
Proving the existence of circumstances is easier than showing actual
partiality or dependence, which is the historical practice of the ICSID.166
Historically, challenges to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator
have been rare and set a relatively high burden of proof for the challenging
party.167 Although there have been few recent decisions, such as Blue Bank
International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and
Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, that have relied on the
“appearance” instead of a “manifest” lack of independence or impartiality, it is
still quite uncertain whether the trend of ICSID cases would change the
substantive interpretation of challenge of the impartiality under ICSID.168
b. Jurisdictional and Procedural Simplicity
In contrast to the ICSID, the establishment of arbitration jurisdiction under
the UNCITRAL does not require joining a convention, it just requires consent
of jurisdiction in the arbitration clause of a contract, treaty, or domestic law.169
Because the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not contain any other
jurisdictional hurdles, there is more legal certainty about the eligibility of
conflict for settlement through the chosen form of arbitration than exists under
the ICSID.170
UNCITRAL also has simpler procedural requirements. In particular, the
2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules no longer require an arbitration agreement
to be “in writing.”171 The 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules also do not
164

Sullivan & Wickramasooriya, supra note 160.
Al-Hawamdeh et al., The Effects of Arbitrator’s Lack of Impartiality and Independence on the
Arbitration Proceedings and the Task of Arbitrators Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, 11 J. POL. & L. 66
(2018).
166
See id.
167
Peter Horn, A Matter of Appearances: Arbitrator Independence and Impartiality in ICSID Arbitration,
11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 349, 349 (2014).
168
Id. at 349–53.
169
G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, sec. 1 art. 1.1 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976].
170
See Gligor, supra note 95, at 688.
171
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, supra note 157, art. 1(2).
165
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require that “the parties to arbitration be ‘parties to a contract’ as was stated in
the 1976 Rules.”172 Such requirements allow “a dispute arising from any kind of
legal relationship to be referred to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules ….
[and makes] the UNCITRAL Rules … directly applicable to investor–state
arbitration.”173
c. Reduced Costs
The costs of arbitration grow with the complexity of the cases.174 One of the
most important issues to investors and parties involved in a dispute is costs. Such
costs include arbitrator, expert witness, and administrative fees.175 The parties
would prefer a “cost & time-efficient” procedure.176
Under the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, arbitral tribunals are allowed
to “direct that witnesses, including expert witnesses, be examined through
means of telecommunication that do not require their physical presence at the
hearing (such as videoconference).”177 The use of technology in the arbitration
process could improve procedural efficiency of parties to arbitrating in front of
the UNCITRAL and could decrease costs to BRI parties by reducing
administrative and witness fees through telecommunication.178
The parties even have the opportunity to review the arbitrators’ fees and
expenses. Article 41(3) provides that the tribunal must inform the parties of its
proposal as to how it will determine its fees and that, within fifteen days of
receiving the tribunal’s proposal, the parties may refer this proposal to the
appointing authority for review.179 Within forty-five days of the receipt of such
a referral, the appointing authority shall adjust the fees and expenses and this
shall be binding upon the tribunal.180 If the appointing authority fails to act

172
Doug Jounes & Timothy Zahara, Highlights of the New 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, CLAYTON
UTZ (Oct. 2011), https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2011/october/highlights-of-the-new-2010-uncitralarbitration-rules.
173
Id.
174
Kenneth Reisenfeld & Joshua Robbins, The Achilles’ Heel of Investor–State Arbitration Awards, LAW
360 (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Litigation/2016/Articles/12-07-2016-Law360Robbins-Reisenfeld.pdf.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, supra note 157, art. 28(4).
178
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Thomas Schulz, The Use of Information Technology in Arbitration,
JUSLETTER (Dec. 5, 2005), http://lk-k.com/wp-content/uploads/The-Use-of-Information-Technology-inArbitration.pdf.
179
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, supra note 157, art. 41(3).
180
Id.
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within those forty-five days or refuses to do so, a party may refer the review of
the tribunal’s proposal to the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in the Hague.181
2. Disadvantages of UNCITRAL’s Abritration Rules
a. Lack of Enforcement Procedure
Unlike the ICSID Convention, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are model
laws that do not include a binding enforcement procedure to make an arbitral
award final and valid without judicial interference.182 The only way to enforce
the UNCITRAL arbitral award is through the enforcement and recognition
provisions under the New York Convention.183 The New York Convention, also
called the U.N. Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, is a convention that provides a uniform standard to enforce arbitral
awards in signatory countries.184 However, according to the New York
Convention Article V, national courts may refuse to recognize and enforce an
arbitral award if a party brings the request and proves the opposition grounds
listed in the Convention.185 For instance, Article V(2)(b) states that the state
might not enforce an arbitration award if “[t]he recognition or enforcement of
the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”186 However,
courts in different countries may make inconsistent decisions, which could
create uncertainty, and harm the corporations and countries.187 For example,
China may refuse to enforce an arbitral award made by a UNCITRAL tribunal
based on public policy if the Chinese domestic court finds the investment is a
cover for bribery or corruption.188

181

Id. art.41(4)(b).
Kamal Huseynli, Enforcement of Investment Arbitration Awards: Problems and Solutions, 3 BAKU ST.
U. L. REV. 40, 60 (2017).
183
Id.
184
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, intro., June 7, 1959, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
185
Id. art. V(1).
186
Id. art. V(2).
187
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1558 (2005).
188
Alfred Wu, et al., Belt and Road Initiative Managing Disputes Risk When Working with States and
SOEs in Infrastructure and Construction Projects, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (May 2019), https://
www.nortonrosefulbright.com/-/media/files/nrf/nrfweb/knowledge-pdfs/international-arbitration-report—issue-12.pdf?la=en&revision=2af60927-1ed7-46ae-b317-5af59b72c270.
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b. Lack of an Appellate System
The enforcement through New York Convention has a potential problem of
uncertainty because of a reciprocity reservation under Article I(3).189 “[A]ny
State may … declare that it will [only] apply the [New York] Convention to the
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State.”190 The New York Convention requires the country where the
arbitral award is made to give consent to be bound under the Convention in order
for the rules of the New York Convention to apply.191 To ensure enforcement of
the arbitral award the party involved should elect to arbitrate in a country that is
a signatory to the New York Convention.192
However, courts in some jurisdictions would interpret the reciprocity
reservation clause differently.193 For example, China would only enforce arbitral
awards made in countries that recognize arbitral awards made in China.194
Bulgaria would enforce the award made in non-signatory countries if those
countries would enforce arbitration made in Bulgaria.195 Cuba would enforce the
arbitration if there is a signed mutual reciprocity agreement between the two
parties in the dispute.196 Inconsistent application of the reciprocity principle, as
it relates to the enforcement of the New York Convention, creates a barrier to
enforce arbitration awards and increases legal uncertainty for parties
involved.197
Additionally, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not include an appellate
system for reconsideration of the reasoning and decision-making made by a
arbitral tribunal.198 Instead, the parties need to appeal to the court in the place
where the arbitration was held.199 There is inconsistency regarding the national
court’s power over annulment of arbitral awards made outside of their
189
Courtney Furner, Uncertainty Regarding the Existence and Future of the Reciprocity Reservation
Under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958),
TERRALEX CONNECTIONS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.lalive.law/data/publications/Terralex_Connections.pdf.
190
New York Convention, supra note 185, art. I(3).
191
Furner, supra note 189.
192
DAVID D. CARRON & LEE M. CAPLAN, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES: A COMMENTARY 86
(2d ed. 2013).
193
Furner, supra note 189.
194
Wu, et al., supra note 188.
195
Furner, supra note 189.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Paul Stothard & Jenna Anne de Jong, Request for Reconsideration in ICSID and UNCITRAL
Arbitrations, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 2017), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/
publications/5fc4ee47/requests-for-reconsideration-in-icsid-and-uncitral-arbitrations.
199
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territory.200 For instance, countries involved in BRI projects, like Hungary, Sri
Lanka, and Russia ruled that only the court where the arbitral award is made has
the power to annul the arbitral award.201 BRI countries such as Bangladesh and
Pakistan believe their national courts are able to exercise jurisdiction to annul
arbitral awards made outside of their countries.202 Some BRI countries including
Indonesia and Tanzania have not yet made any decision on this issue.203 The
uncertainty about the annulment issue resulting from UNCITRAL’s lack of an
appellate system provided countries with discretion to decide this issue
themselves.204 However, as stated, neither investors nor sovereign states want
uncertainty in the ISA process.205
c. Inefficiency
While claimants want to get a final ruling in a relatively short amount of
time, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not provide a strict deadline for when
arbitrators need to come up with procedural rules or final arbitral awards.206
Parties involved in investment arbitration held under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules have the sole discretion to come up with the procedural rules.
Compliance of the parties or the attorneys in UNCITRAL arbitral tribunals to
such rules are not supervised by any institution.207 The effectiveness of the
tribunal ultimately depends on the speed and willingness of the parties to
cooperate and comply the procedural rule.208
Whereas in ICSID arbitration there is a supervisory institution in the ICSID
Secretariat, under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules no such institution
exists.209 The parties involved in arbitration, especially the government, might

200
See HAMID GHARAVI, THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANNULMENT OF AN ARBITRAL 12–
19 (2002).
201
See id. at 12–15.
202
See id. 17–20.
203
See id. at 21.
204
See id. at 22.
205
See Furner, supra note 189.
206
Huang Tao & Dai Yue, Forum Shopping in China: CIETAC vs. UNCITRAL, CHINA L. INSIGHT
(July 29, 2011), https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/07/articles/dispute-resolution/forum-shopping-inchina-cietac-vs-uncitral/.
207
Alyssa Grikscheit, Book Note, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1989, 1992 n.20 (1994) (reviewing ISSAK I. DORE,
THE UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1993)) (citing MARTIN
HUNTER ET AL., THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND ADR: CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS
3 (1993)).
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Diana Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for Change, 11 J. INT’L
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delay the proceedings.210 Parties might appear late or fail to appear at all.211
Without proper supervision, parties or their attorneys might become emotional
or outrageous during hearings which would be difficult to control.212 Arbitrators
may not provide a final award on schedule. The parties have no recourse because
there is no supervisory institution.213 As William Park states:
Ad hoc arbitration may be problematic due to the lack of institutional
oversight. The supervisory vacuum will often serve to delight a
defendant wishing to drag its feet. Moreover, courts asked to enforce
awards obtained by default in ad hoc arbitration may be more
concerned that the defaulting party did in fact obtain proper notice of
the proceedings than they would be if the award bears the imprimatur
of an institution ….214

UNCITRAL tried to improve the efficiency of arbitration proceedings in the
2010 update to the rules. However, some of the updated provisions, such as the
regulation regarding multiple claimants and respondents, seem inconceivable for
ISAs.215 Article 17(5) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules allows for the
joinder of other parties to the arbitration if the inclusion of these parties would
not prejudice any other party.216 However, the investment arbitration
proceedings of UNCITRAL are primarily based on bilateral investment treaties
(BITs).217 If multiple states are allowed to become joint-parties in a single case,
especially the situation when joint-parties are not from the same country of the
original claimant and they all bring claim against a single country government,
it would mean difficult to use a single BIT agreement as a legal basis for such
ISA.218
d. Difficulties in Chinese Practice
China favors institutional arbitration.219 Ad hoc arbitration tribunals, like
those under the UNCITRAL, in early BITs between China and other countries
210
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could only address compensation issues surrounding state seizure of private
property for public use. 220 Although, China has broadened use of international
arbitration to govern disputes and many Chinese BITs choose ad hoc tribunals
under UNCITRAL Rules as a forum of solving disputes, there is an
incompatibility between Chinese domestic law and ad hoc arbitration.221
Chinese Arbitration Law does not recognize ad hoc arbitration.222 If the
parties agree to solve the disputes by ad hoc arbitration but do not specify an
international arbitration institution to administer the arbitration in the agreement,
the Chinese court can deem the agreement void.223 Although Chinese Arbitration
Law was greatly influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Laws,224 Chinese
arbitration law does not exactly follow the UNCITRAL Model Law.225
Chinese Arbitration Law has provisions that contradict the UNCITRAL
Model Law.226 For instance, UNCITRAL Model Laws only grant annulment
power to the national court if the court finds serious procedural problems. Under
Chinese Arbitration Law, the national court has the power to annul the arbitral
award based on serious procedural issues and substantive legal issues.227
Another example is that the UNCITRAL Model Laws give the arbitral tribunal
the power to decide issues of jurisdiction.228 However, Chinese Arbitration Law
provides that only permanent arbitration committees have the power to decide
jurisdictional issues.229
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C. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC) was established in 1956.230 It was originally called the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission of the International Trade Promotion Commission.231
Originally, CIETAC settled foreign trade related disputes.232 However, with
increasing in-bound and out-bound international investments and economic
development in China, CIETAC became the institution to settle a wide variety
of investment and commercial disputes between Chinese entities and foreign
parties.233 In October 2017, CIETAC became an international investment
arbitration institution.234 Currently CIETAC is designed to better support
Chinese investors in BRI projects.235 CIETAC now has jurisdiction over
“international investment disputes arising out of contracts, treaties, laws and
regulations, or other instruments” between investors and states.236
CIETAC arbitration begins when one party presents a claim to CIETAC and
the other party involved in the dispute gives consent to arbitration by CIETAC
or participates in the arbitration without objection.237 The BITs signed in the past
would be well suited for CIETAC arbitration.238 For instance, the China–
Uzbekistan BIT signed in 2011 states that claims may be solved in domestic
court, ICSID arbitration, ad hoc UNCITRAL tribunals, or other arbitration
institutions/ad hoc tribunals agreed to by the parties.239 This agreement gives the
possibility of settling the disputes in front of the CIETAC. Not only do modern
BITs have the possibility to be referred to the CIETAC, but also the CIETAC
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rules can be applied to investor–state disputes based on BIT that was signed
before 2001.240
1. Advantages of CIETAC
a. Choice of Arbitrator
According to Article 11 of the CIETAC rules, the arbitral panel should be
comprised of ethical and independent arbitrators who are well-known experts in
the practice of international investment law.241 CIETAC allows the parties
involved in dispute to choose arbitrators from a list provided by CIETAC.242 The
parties also have the freedom to nominate arbitrators who are not on the list
under mutual agreement.243 However, nominated arbitrators are subject to
confirmation from the Chairman of CIETAC.244 Most arbitrators on the
CIETAC list are of Chinese nationality.245 The availability of Chinese arbitrators
might be attractive for Chinese investor-claimants.
b. Low Cost and Efficiency
The fees for seeking arbitration at CIETAC are much lower than the ICSID.
CIETAC only charges RMB 10,000 (approximately USD $14,000) as
registration fee after the CIETAC accept an arbitration case under its
jurisdiction.246 The arbitration fee varies according to the amount in dispute.247
The ICSID, by comparison, charges a non-refundable fee of USD $25,000 when
the request for arbitration is lodged and charges USD $42,000 in administrative
fees when a request for arbitration is registered.248 The ICSID charges and
additional USD $3000 per day for the administrative works related to the
240
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China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission International Investment Arbitration
Rules (For Trial Implementation), art. 11 (promulgated by the China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade
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242
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243
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arbitration proceedings.249 Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the
tribunal considers the circumstances in each case in deciding the arbitration
fees.250 However, according to one study, which analyzes and compares the
amount of arbitrations fees in cases arbitrated by ICSID and UNCITRAL, the
arbitration fees for a UNCITRAL arbitration are ten percent more than for an
ICSID arbitration.251 A unique feature of CIETAC is early dismissal of a claim
which provides the possibility for the parties to save the time and money spent
on arbitration.252
Moreover, parties may consolidate two or more disputes when the disputes
“involve common questions of law or fact, and such disputes arise out of the
same events or circumstances.”253 Without consolidation, the party who has two
disputes with similar facts and issues would have to spend double the amount of
time on hearings and other administrative procedures.254 The parties would also
need to spend twice as much on costs for presenting the expert witnesses and
arbitration fees.255 Costs of arbitrators usually are the largest expenses that the
party has to spend on arbitration.256
Furthermore, unlike under the ICSID or UNCITRAL, third-party funding is
allowed under the CIETAC.257 Third-party funding refers to when one party is
financed by a party who is not involved in the proceeding.258 According to
CIETAC rules, a “party must notify the Tribunal and the other Parties as soon
as any third party funding agreement is concluded, including the nature of the
agreement and the identity of the funder. The Tribunal may also order disclosure
of any other relevant information.”259 Due to the size of claims in investment
arbitration, both the costs and compensation that a winning party may receive
249
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are sizeable.260 The third-party funder pays for the arbitration costs in return for
a certain percentage of the compensation.261 Third-party financing is attractive
for investors because it reduces the costs of arbitration and decreases the risks
associated with the expensive arbitration.262 Funders analyze the claims before
financing the arbitration costs, ultimately helping the claimants to better assess
their claims, to avoid bringing invalid claims that waste money.263
Also, according to CIETAC Investor–State Arbitration Rules, the parties
automatically give consent to jurisdiction of CIETAC as arbitration institution
for ISA if they agree to arbitrate under the CIETAC Arbitration Rules.264 If
parties agree to be bound by the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, they also give
consent to use CIETAC as the arbitration institution.265 For instance, when
parties choose CIETAC’s Hong Kong Arbitration Center as the arbitration
institution or Hong Kong as the seat of arbitration, CIETAC’s Hong Kong
Arbitration Center may handle investment dispute arbitration cases brought
under the Rules.266
c. Familiarity with Chinese Law and Incorporation of Chinese Culture
Choosing CIETAC to form the arbitral tribunal would be beneficial for
Chinese investors in BRI projects because CIETAC is more familiar with
Chinese law and practice. This familiarity would bring more assurance to
investors and avoid possible bias due to a lack of legal understanding.267 For
infrastructure investments that require a concession agreement between the host
state and Chinese investors, the latter may insist that any dispute arising under
the agreement be referred to Chinese arbitral institutions, like CIETAC.
Choosing “a Beijing-located forum for the settlement of investment disputes …
would be favored by Chinese investors over other available forums such as
domestic courts in host states and Washington-based ICSID.”268
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Also, the CIETAC Rules incorporate Chinese cultural features, which might
make it more appealing to Chinese investors.269 For instance, the concept of
acting in good faith is incorporated in China’s Civil Code and China’s Civil
Procedural Code.270 Article 6 of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules imposes an
obligation on the parties involved to act in good faith.271 A feature of the Chinese
culture is that parties involved in disputes are more likely to resolve these
disputes in a more peaceful way, such as through mediation and negotiation,
instead of intense debate and litigation in a court or arbitral tribunal.272 Articles
6 and 43 of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules give parties a choice to conduct
mediation before entering into an arbitration proceeding.273 The tribunal makes
a judgment about whether mediation is appropriate.274 If the arbitrators approve,
the mediation will be held confidentially and a settlement agreement may be
reached between the parties during the mediation.275
The Chinese government supports extending CIETAC’s jurisdiction in
international investment arbitration.276 China expressly stated its concern about
incorporating unique legal features into ISAs during the UNCITRAL Working
Group sessions:
The current arbitration proceedings are carried out in some specific
languages and most arbitrators use several specific languages or come
from certain specific backgrounds, they may lack the relevant
knowledge about the legal cultures of other countries. So for many
developing countries including China, currently, we are facing
difficulties related to language in terms of translation of our documents
and this may also cause some extra delay and extra costs.277

China’s State Council, the highest administrative authority in China, supports
the CIETAC Arbitration Rules to better protect Chinese investors overseas and
facilitate BRI projects.278
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2. Disadvantages of CIETAC
a. Default Transparency
Under the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, all hearings are transparent by default
if neither party nor the tribunal raises opposition.279 Information related to the
arbitration, except confidential and other “protected information” of the parties,
may also be publicly disclosed by CIETAC unless the parties agree otherwise.280
This includes the request for arbitration, the answer to the request,
counterclaims, parties’ written submissions, transcripts, and awards.281 Parties
selecting the CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules have the opportunity to
negotiate their desired level of transparency to be included in their arbitration
agreement.282 However, if an agreement cannot be reached, the default will be
transparency.283 As mentioned earlier, investors and governments have a
reserved attitude towards transparency during ISA.284 Therefore, investors who
would prefer to have a confidential proceeding might have concerns about the
transparency feature of the CIETAC arbitration institution.285
b. Inexperience and Difficulty in Promoting New Institutions
Finally, although China has been involved in some ISAs, China does not
have much experience in handling and making arbitral awards for ISAs.286 There
are relatively few Chinese arbitrators who have experiences in the major
international investment arbitration institutions.287 It may take a long time for
the CIETAC to establish its credibility and reputation for making the entities
willing to be bind under the CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules and bring
the case to CIETA for arbitration.288 Also, the CIETAC Investment Arbitration
Rules were specifically designed to protect Chinese investors in BRI projects.289
It may be difficult for the rest of the world to believe that CIETAC is a
multilateral legal framework that provides sufficient protection for anyone other
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than Chinese investors because of its stated intent to protect Chinese investors.290
The goal of CIETAC is to counter the “backlash against economic globalization
and multilateralism in international economic governance in general, and … the
existing international system for the protection of foreign investment.”291
CONCLUSION
While Chinese investors have only asserted a total of five claims against
other governments, this number is certain to increase with increasing outbound
investments.292 While no specific treaty provides legal protection for BRI
investors, the degree of protection to foreign investors in investment laws vary
among BRI countries.293 Given the risks associated with large infrastructure
projects and the likelihood of legal disputes, it is important for Chinese investors
to choose the most appropriate investment arbitration institution to protect their
interests.294
A lot of countries participating in BRI project include ICSID and
UNCITRAL arbitration in their BITs with China.295 ICSID and UNCITRAL are
the most widely recognized arbitration mechanisms in the world. This has an
externality net effect that makes it hard for a new arbitration institution, like
CIETAC, to attract parties to bring investment disputes before it.296 At the same
time, CIETAC does not have enough experience and expertise in dealing with
investment arbitrations.297 These features make it difficult for CIETAC to
establish international recognition.298 However, dominance of the ICSID and
UNCITRAL does not mean that they monopolize the ISAs.299 Ecuador, Bolivia,
and Venezuela have already withdrawn from ICSID convention.300 Many
African and Latin American countries are establishing their own mechanisms,
like the Union of South American Nations to handle the ISAs.301 Bolivia and
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Ecuador have developed their own national mechanism to deal with international
investment disputes.302
Moreover, although CIETAC does not have much ISA experience, CIETAC
has been widely recognized as a trustworthy commercial arbitration institution
with few opposing voices from foreign lawyers.303 CIETAC is an independent
organization, which mainly gets its income from arbitration fees instead of from
the Chinese government.304 The CIETAC Rules incorporate Chinese legal
features, one of the biggest concerns for Chinese entities during international
arbitration.305 The majority of the arbitrators provided by CIETAC are Chinese
nationals and likely have a better understanding of Chinese legal norms and
domestic rules.306 The Chinese government also has a positive attitude towards
the use of the CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules in BRI project documents.
As most of the investors involved in BRI projects are Chinese state-owned
entities, Chinese investors may prefer an arbitration institution that can better
satisfy their needs.307
One of the concerns for investors is the finality and enforceability of an ISA
arbitral award.308 However, as mentioned earlier, UNCITRAL cannot provide
such certainty because UNCITRAL does not have its own enforcement
mechanism. Rather, the enforcement of UNCITRAL arbitral awards is based on
the New York Convention enforcement procedure.309 However, a lot of
enforcement uncertainties remain in the New York Convention since different
nations have various interpretations regarding the enforcement provisions in the
New York Convention.310 China has reciprocity reservation to the New York
Convention, but some BRI participants are not parties to the Convention (e.g.,
East Timor, Maldives, Iraq, Turkmenistan, and Yemen) or have different
attitudes on reciprocity reservation.311 China also can reject the arbitral award
due to public policy concerns.312 Meanwhile, China has conservative attitude
towards ad hoc arbitration.313
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Although the ICSID does not have the enforcement problem, and has
efficient procedures, the cost of conducting ICSID arbitration is much higher
than CIETAC arbitration.314 The arbitration costs using UNCITRAL arbitration
is also high.315 The costs for investment arbitration, including the payments to
attorneys and arbitrators, are usually substantial.316 Compared to the ICSID and
UNCITRAL, CIETAC has low administrative costs related to arbitration
proceeding and incorporates features that are beneficial to investors.317 Thirdparty funding for arbitration proceedings reduces the burden on investors and
also helps investors to better evaluate their chances of success before entering
into arbitration.318 Consolidating similar disputes also helps reduce spending on
arbitrators and expert witness.319 CIETAC adopts a transparent procedure rule,
like ICSID and UNCITRAL, a feature investors do not prefer.320
CIETAC may need more time to establish expertise in handling ISAs.321
However, the CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules adopt Chinese features,
have low costs and provide familiarity with Chinese law that the other two ISA
institutions and rules do not. BRI investors, particularly Chinese state-owned
entities, are likely to choose CIETAC for arbitration to solve ISAs in future
agreements.
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